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Prexy Nesbitt 
Sometimes you have to do it to the children to 
make the adults talk. There ·was a 12-year-old 
boy. We wanted to know what was going on.. We 
wanted his mother to talk, so we tied him up like 
a chicken with his wrists behind his back, 
strapped to his ankles. Then we played water 
polo with him, put him in this kind of d~m and 
pushed him about, let him sink. Every so often 
we took him out. H~ wouldn't cry. He just wet 
himself. The mother didn't tell us anything. 
In the end w_e just left him in the water and he 
drowned. 
--Trevor Edwards, a British mercenary 
on operations for the South African 
Army in Angola (Guardian, 29.1, 1981) 
That South Africa is one of the world's most violent societies 
is now indisputable. One facet of its violence is. derived from the 
deep structural inequities and repression of the system. It is the 
violence t~ people's lives that emanates from situations like those 
I 
identified in a recent Carnegie Corporation-financed study entitled, 
"The Second Carnegie Inquiry f nto Poverty in Southern Africa." Among 
the study's findings were the following: 
a) the number ) of people made destitute by landlessness and 
unemployment had increased between 1960 and 1980 from · · 
4.9 million to 8.9 million; 
b) that the migratory labor system destroys family life. 
One-third of the migrant male workers of several villages 
interviewed spent only one month per year with their 
families; 
c) on the white-owned farms, black laborers earned as Little 
as $10 a month and 63% of the men were underweight; and 
d) some black rural areas had one doctor for every 174,999 
people. 
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Nineteen eighty-five has made it patently cl~ar that t~e major 
trademark of the Pretoria government is violence. In the last nine-
teen months, a minimum of 1,400 people have ~een killed in South Africa, 
an average of five/day, is what the Institute of Race Relations called it, 
t~e majority as a result of police bullets. As many as 23 major 
leaders of. the country's largest legal opposition, the United Demo-
cratic Front (with over 1.5 million members), have been killed or are 
missing under suspicious circumstances. 
Additionally, there is a clear pattern of vigilante and death 
squad violence in South Africa. The methods used by the groups vary 
from harassment to acid in the eyes of activists' children to murder 
and mutilation. Some acts are directed at little-known activists, 
others, like the 1980 slaying of black attorney Griffiths Mxenge and 
the 1985 slaying of his wife, lawyer Victoria Mxenge, are directed at 
prominent leadership. According to Africa News, some 800 incident~ 
are known to have ocurred since 1965. 
Another aspect of the violence in South Africa is the violence 
of a totaliy militarized soci~ty. It is rooted in the two to three 
million dollars per day which the South African Defence Force (SADF) 
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expends today in Namibia and in South Africa .itself. It is in the 
"total strategy" all-out-war mentality manifesting itself widely in 
'' 
South Africa and, as well, in Namibia. The "total strategy" was 
articulated first in a 1977 Defence Department White . Paper on National 
Security. Today, it is the South African polity 1 s new and revised 
I 
bible. Drafted shortly after the 1976 Soweto uprising, the total 
strategy argues that South Africa is engaged in a war against a 
multi-dimensional campaign which Russia (and its allies like the 
World Council Qf Churches, the U.S. Conference of ,Mayors, the Congres-
sional Black Caucus, TransAfrica and the American Committee on Africa) 
. ' . is waging against the West. It is a _campaign with a goal, according 
to a 1982 government commission on the media, "of nothing les.s than 
the political and moral subversion of the white man and his replace-
ment by a black majority government . . • .. . It is therefore essential," 
argues the 1977 White Paper, "that a Total National Strategy be 
formulated at the highest level. The defence of the Republic of 
-South Africa is not soley the responsibility of the Department of 
Defence. On the contrary • • • (it) is the combined responsibility of 
... 
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'.J a.11 government de-partments. This can be taken further--i t is the 
responsibility of the entire population, the nation and every popu-
" · 
lation group." 
Thus, it is that South Africa today is really run by the semi-
secret State Security Council (SSC), chaired and dominated by President 
Botha, former Minister of Defence, and staffed by military officers. 
As the Washington Post noted as early as 1980, "in many ways the 
I 
State Security Council is already an alternative cabinet by virtue of 
the decisions it makes." 
But there is another aspect to the violence of apartheid, one 
which receives scant attention in the U.S. press. It is the violence ' 
which manifests itself in the brutal, nearly bi-monthly destabili-
' ' 
zation raids and actions which South Africa and its surrogate forces 
(UNITA in Angola, the MNR in Mozambique, and similar , formations in 
Zimbabwe and Lesotho, e.g., the Lesotho Liberation Army) conduct$ 
upon the neigh~oring countries of Angola, Mozambique, Lesotho, 
~S,/~~;,_ 
Botswana and Zambia./ ';Pl=l6HilQ~aids include. the May 4, 19 78 Kassinga, 
( Angola invasion ( 800 WOll!i'n and children killed) ; 
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Matola Mozambique raid on an ANC home (13 killed); the May 23, 1982 
attack on Matola and bombing of Maputo factories (19 Mozambican 
; ' 
citizens killed); the December 9, 1982 invasion of Maseru, Lesotho 
(42 South refugees and Lesotho citizens killed); the June 14, 1985 
invasion of Gabrone, Botswana (16 killed, one of them a six-year-old 
girl); the January 1, 1986 South African economic blockade of Lesotho, 
:) 
~the January 20, 1986 South African-sponsored coup d'etat of the 
Mi Ma-a 1qa ~ \ f\ \/G\',l~ ~ ~o.. I ~~~ c~ 
'J- -J l fkb"'1,.... 
Jonathan Leabua government in Lesoth'J/\ In Angola alone the damage 
done by South African invasions and sabotage of Angolan industrial 
installations (e.g., the June 1985 attempted sabotage of Gulf Oil's 
facilities in Cabinda, Angola) since 1975 is conservatively estimated 
at ten to twelve billion dollars. In the four-year period between 
1981 antl 1985 South Africa carried out 4,000 invasions of Angolan 
airspace, 168 bombing raids, . 234 'airborne troop landings, 90 strafing 
I 
incidents, 74 ground attacks and four naval landings. Since 1975 
I 
South African army forces and the So~th African-backed UNITA force 
~ave killed and wounded thousands of Angolan civilians and Namibian 
refugees. The.lives of hundreds of thousands more have been disrupted 
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by the constant state of war r hich the Angolan people have experi-
enced, starting with the struggle against Portugese colonialism in 
,, 
1961. 
Mozambique has suffered in the same way as Angola from the brutal 
)-. policies of ?lg~ressia>n and destabilization which Pretoria pursues 
throughout the region . . Samora Machel, President of Mozambique, noted 
in a 1984 .speech that: 
Our people had their property looted, their houses 
destroyed, their granaries looted, their crops pillaged 
and flattened, their tools burnt and destroyed. The 
~~~ ~ommunal villages and cooperatives, the schools and 
A.:\t\~ clinics ·, the wells and dams built by the people with 
(!,. ,to\,Q..,jl,,. so much effort and sacrifice became targets for the 
\~ enemies' criminal f ,ury. The systematic destruction 
. 
1 l of economic infrastructure, bridges and roads, shop~ 
and warehouses, sawmills, plantations, agricultural 
and industrial machinery, electricity supply lines, 
fuel tanks, lorries and buses, locomotives and 
carriages has prevented the implementation of economic 
development projects of the utmost importance for the 
well-being of the Mozambican people. 
840 school.shave been destroyed or closed, affecting 
more than 150,000 schoolchildren. Twelve health 
centres, 24 maternity clinics, 174 health posts and 
two centres for the physically handicapped have been 
sacked and destroyed. Nine hundred shops have been 
destroyed, hampering marketing and supplies for about 
~our and a half million citizens. · 
It is the final point in the Machel selection above which illustrates 
the most basic trait of the South African government raids (or those 
of its surrogates, UNITA and MNR) which should bee highlighted. 
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As is the case with U.S. aggression against Nicaragua, the 
primary objective of South African/MNR/UNITA attacks is the popu-
' ' 
lation itself of the countries involved. True, often it is the 
infrastructure targets--bridges, highways, water stations, power 
installations--in Angola and Mozambique which are attacked. But 
increasingly it is schools, hospitals; marketplaces, churches 
. I 
supportive · of government policies, e.g., the M~thodist Church in 
Angola and its.outspoken bishop, which are the ta~gets. The goal 
of the attacks is beyond the mere physical destruction of a facility 
or institution. Rather, it is to make the general population lose 
its faith and belief in the ability of the government to govern; it 
is to undercut the legitimacy of an Angola, Mozambique or Nicaragua 
by destroying the people's will to believe in the dream and partici-
pate in the building of the new society . . President Jose Eduardo dos 
Santos described the South African/UNITA attacks as aiming at "weaken-
ing the (Angolan) economy and wiping out the social achievements won 
by the workers." World-renown scholar John Saul, in his brilliant 
November 1985 paper on Soubh African aggression, prepared for the 
Insert 
But let us place 
~ .1. - f • • s~ 11-Mc.. - ,. f-..\ .,...,..._..., ... , ,.,. •~-
,- ..--.-o Q.,.,, ... ~ '"' t-: .... 
~this
11
on a broader plane. Samor"a .,..,_.,_ 
Machel captured the essence of ;•what is fearful about 
the angolas,cubas,nicaraguas and mozambiques of the world 
when he said: 
Because we follow aoclaliam aa a path to development, we 
are the targets of criminal actlona unleashed by Imperial-
lam. Thoae acUona are manipulated directly by the Pre-
toria regime which finances and arms bandits •..• Eco-
nomic, political and social destabilization la the central 
and fundamental objecUve of racist South Africa when It 
sends Into our country gangs of loyal servants to carry out 
Ila ordera, 102 
Aa Prutdent Machel put It, South Africa "ls attacking our decision 
to defeat underdevelopment": 
The Pretoria minority regime le afraid of our victory over 
underdevelopment. They are afraid that succeaa In this 
decade wlll demonstrate the superiority of the socialist 
ayatem. The South African regime Is afraid that the con-
aolldatlon of our development will accelerate the dynamic 
of the economic llberaUon !of Southern Africa, that It will 
be a stimulus for the total liberation of the peoples of the 
regton.103 
_ _ ---,----~-~, ~ ~ 
The South African regime, a few days ago, alleged that Mozambique threatened 
it by concentrating sophisticated arms on its frontiers. What are the arms to 
which they refer? Neither economically nor militarily do we represent a threat 
to anyone. No reasonable person can think that an underdeveloped country as 
poor as we, still bloodied from the wounds of war, can pose a threat to the sover- . 
eignty, and territorial ~tegrity, the stability of another state, particularly one as/ 
powerful as South Africa. In fact, the only thing that the regime can fear is our 
example of creating a non-racial society. (President Samora Machel quoted in 
Noticias, August 24, 1982) 
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It 's th'is that th t f the . $outh . ~frican government s ca res e s__ o u o ., . . . . . .. an o 
its allies and leads them to take the ~ath which 
Basil Davidson has described in the following way: 
J 
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African Studies Association, called the types of attacks currently 
being · conducted by South African-backed MNR efforts to e,clipse the 
I , 
popular enthusiasm of the Mozambican people for their FRELIMO govern-
~nt.~ 
In some respects, South African aggression against Mozambique and 
Angola, against the frontline states generally and especially against 
the effort for ·regional unity, S.A.D.C.C', is not new. The verses may 
be different but the refrain is the same. ~~ 
7 
Throu~hout the 1960s South Africa and the U.S. were the iron 
fist and velvet glove duo in terms of political, economic and military 
support to Portugal as it desperately sought to maintain its overseas 
' 
colonies in Africa. South African troops fought side py side with 
the Portugese in both Angola and in Mozambique. At various points 
during the war, · South Africa1n helicopters flew supply and reconnais-
sance Llissions. In Bie Province, South African soldiers guarded 
I 
the Kassinga iron mines. In 1969 South Africa joined Portugal in 
the Cunene River development scheme not only to g,et a cheap source 
of electricity for South Africa but also to bolster the already-
✓ 
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flagging Portugese resolve to remain in Angola. In December 1971, 
President Richard Nixon followed up his 19 70 U. N. sanctions-violating -· 
,· 
contribution of 22 Cessna duo-purpose light planes to the South 
African military wiht what he called a Christmas gift of $436 million 
in economic assistance to Portugal--all part of the Azores Pact 
between Portugal and the U.S.A. (The Azores Pact was , incidentally 
a supplement to the over $320 million in direct military a ·ssistance 
given to Portugal during 1950-1970, the military training programs, 
the Boeing 707s and the regular shipments of napalm and herbicides.) 
Rambo Rides Silver Towards the Benguela: 
the 1985-86 U.S. intervention into Angola 
What is new in the current situation of the South African/U.S. 
offensives against the frontline states, especially Angola, is the 
intensity and scope of the Reagan Administration's intervention to 
destroy the People's Republic of Angola. Let us review briefly 
some of the more recent developments: 
Nesbitt. page lO 
*.From the inception of the Reagan Administration in 19 80, 
conservative forces mobilize against both Angola and 
', 
Mozambique, e.g., Senator Richar Lugar opines in the 
December 15,, 1980
1 
Washington Star that it is urgent to 
help UNITA stem the tide of l980s-style Soviet "white 
I 
European imperial~sm in a Black African nation"; 
*In July 1985, the Clark Amendment, originally passed in 
1976 prohibiting covert or overt U.S. assistance to 
rebels fighting in Angola; is repealed by the Congress; 
' ~ . 
•:. 
-·----
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/ 
Throughout 1985 the conservative lobby led by organizations 
like the Conservative Caucus, the Heritage Foundation and 
the American Security Council and by . individuals like Senators 
Jesse Helms, and Representat ives ·Jack Kemp and Claude Pepper 
mobilizes to: 1) attack Gulf/Chevron for continuin~ to do 
busin~ss with Angola (Gulf is the key purchaser of Angolan 
petroleum which provides mo~t .of Angola's revenuP.0; and 
2) to project ·Jonas Savimbi and UNITA as ·•. true anti-communist . 
freedom fighters. The latt~r effort crirnaxes in a highly 
-publicized tour of the USA by Savimbi and the hirin~ of a 
Reagan-related US publicity firm, Black, Manafert, Stone 
· and Kelly for $600,000/year to do public relations for UNITA 
and Jonas Savimbi. During the tour Reagan says 4'We want to 
"be very helpfvl to what Dr. Savimbi and. his people are trying 
to do;•• 
- In early 1986 an allegedly nationwide coalition of prominent 
conservatives called the RAMBO {Restore a More Benevolent Order) 
kick off a campaign of letter writing, returnine credit cards, 
ana demonstratinr; to protect Gulf/Chevron's operatj_ons in 
Angola. At the same time the US Commerce Department beGan 
actively discouraginY, trade with An£ola despite the fact that 
~ngrila is the third larvest tradin~ partner in Africa; 
- -0~ March 25, 1986 UNITA announced that it ·had flbo~bed ~and 
dynamited oil installationn _owned by Gulf/Chevron in 
·cabinda, ·northern Ane:ola. Q.uestioned about the at.tack a 
· State Department spokesman said the US would condemn an~ 
attack on American lives or nroperty, no matter who was 
doing it;fl -
Meeting in on tJA of , 1986 
, the Org?nization of African Unity (OAU) conde~ned the 
Reagan administration for deciding to forward military 
-assistance to Savlmbi and UNITA. 
Ib April 1986, 6 US Congressmen file a lawsuit to prevent the 
US Export~~rnn.ai;t Bank from extendinr; $101.6 millio·n in loan 
guarantees/\~ proerarn def>ifrnea to facilitat~ fore:i.gh customers 
purchasinE US manufactured goods; · 
- In early April 1986, s~ipments of Stir~A anti-a i r craft w~apons 
and. ant l tank guns sent by F resident Reagan implt~me nt inc . an 
executive order bP.gin arrivine in Southern Anr;ola--presumably 
via Zaire. · In doing this, Rea~an iEnores and bypasses a 
Congre~sional debate raginf:; over whether or not to allow· cove.rt 
or overt assistance to UNITA. Prestdent dos Santos ofAncola 
reacts quickly, declaring that the US can -no lonr,er be a 
mediator in the rev,ion; he asks that the UN mediate instead. 
In the nrocess he reveals a ~itherto secret agreement called the 
Mindelo· Act. Sie;ned by the US and Ane;ola in January 1984, the 
ag~eement provides for the Us to cease flacts -of agg r e ssion against 
Angola and. support for Savimbi 's UNITA • ., 
! • 
· )' 
·.' . 
':. 
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Why? What I s behind the new ·and-· renewed embracinp; of 
· their •out-of-Africci" boy by Reagan ad.ministration? 
; , 
On .one level it is part of the Reagan doctrine of the 
I 
quick American pr·ojection of power • . US intervention into 
' Ang~la is one staging point I of the LIC's (low intensity 
conflicts) which are meant to be carried out ·by non-. 
Americans, ~.e. no spilling of "good 'merican peoples' blood." 
As Time magazine succinctly put it: 
"American boys should not be seen 
dying on the nightly news. Wars 
should be over in three days or less, 
or before the Congress invokes the 
War Powers Act. Victory must be 
assured in advance and the American 
public must be all for it from the 
outset." 
. On another level, US intervention into Angola could 
not ·be better timed in terms of rescuing South Africa. (It's 
like Matt in 'Gunsmoke• coming into the reservation to save 
wounde~ ·chester surr;unded 1by the hostiles.) Every dollar 
which South Africa d.oes not have to g-i ve , to UNITA means fund.s 
I 
released for South Africa to contend. with the r.:rowing cr\sis 
_inside South Africa itself. US assistance also _comes at a 
i 
r . 
. . ....... 
:, 
i, 
-'.1 
'·.· 
.,, 
· ,. 
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point when the FAPLA forces of Angola had cond.ucted. 
I 
increasingly sucessful campaiens against UNITA. In fact, 
I 
d.uring the fall of 1985, it was only ,direct South African 
military intervention which -_saved UNI_TA 's southern headquarters 
from 'beine: decisively overrun. Finally, . it is hoped by Rambo 
and his sons and daughters that 1 thP. projection of Savirnbi in 
I 
.the USA and of UNITA 1 8 struf,[le as beinf. the .major struggle 
in Southern Africa can serve to confuse and thwart the esca-
lating anti-apartheid. movAment insid.e the US itself. As the 
Wa:shington Office on Africq recently pointed. out: 
. ~ .. ~ ' . 
~By pushi~y for US aid to ·UNITA, 
South Africa's allies within the 
administration and. Congress hope 
to repain the rround they believA 
they have loRt and are losinc to the 
anti-apartheid movement. In buildinR 
support fnr UNITA they khow they will 
be str,.:mp;hb=minp.; apartl-teid with in · 
Pretoria's own borders and throu~hout 
southern Africa. US assistance to 
South Africa's agent UNITA will hP-lp 
Pretoria militarily intimidate and 
destabilize Angola, prolon~ South 
Africa's illegal occupation of 
Namibia and aid it in its war against 
SWAPO. If the US a.ssits UNITA, South 
Africa can then divert more of its 
financial resources towards strenp.;theninr; 
its internal security fo~ce's crackdown 
on anti-apartheid opponents~" 
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